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Qazi Mansoor Hassan 
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Reference of alliance NAFTA, yes: NATO, no
By: Muhammad Ahsan Yatu
Updated on Sunday, April 11, 2004 - 1:05:12 PM
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Military operation in tribal areas against the foreign militants has initiated a hot debate on the Pak-US relationship. These militants were being asked since 9/11 to leave or live peacefully but persuasion was not working; yet their presence was being ignored---and that too, in spite of their odd and damaging activities---due to the respect that Pakistani establishment has for tribal elders and their culture. Now, an under pressure Pakistan due to nuclear businesses of its scientists and two deadly attacks on its President had to act aggressively. Mujahids or militants or terrorists whatever they are they came initially to Pakistan because Americans and westerners, and Arabs and Pakistanis needed them. They were required by the first two to destroy USSR, by the third to entrench and extend tribalism in the region, and by the fourth as supporters within their so-assumed strategic depth. Things changed first due to withdrawal of the soviets from Afghanistan, second due to American disengagement, third due to some of the groups acting on their own, fourth due to 9/11. Without going into the morality of operation, the fact remains that security and economy of the state are foremost, and any country would have done the same under the kind of circumstances and pressures that we are facing. However, it is not the first time; our American connection has come under serious questions even before, through three major reasons, which are again the core of the present debate. 1) Internally, it did not help us in evolving an indigenous knowledge based economy. Comparison is made with the Russia-India friendship that helped India in developing an advance technical base. 2) Externally, it did not help us in wars against India; and once the Jihad in Afghanistan, against the Soviets, was over, it left us on our own to face the grave consequences. 3) Morally, it “cheated” us because it was one sided, and at times even at the cost of our sovereignty. Americans too have their questions. 1) That they gave unprecedented economic assistance to Pakistan, which was wasted. 2) That Pakistan exceeded its agreed limits on nuclear programme. 3) That Pakistan did not solve the Afghan problem through consensus. Instead it inducted Taliban into Afghanistan with the help of Arabs, and maintained strong links with them, while ignoring their militancy that was in action the world over.With that much intensity of doubt on both sides, our siding with the US in its war against terrorism was not endorsed wholeheartedly by most of our media experts and analysts, and hence by the majority of the Pakistanis. They were worried that militants will strike back in a manner, which might destabilise us. They were further worried that the fresh engagement might prove one sided again, and in case it did, repercussions would be worse. To some it meant to be cheated again. Less reward for cooperation, maltreatment of Pakistanis in America, activities of FBI in Pakistan, aggressive reaction of militants through deadly attacks on common Pakistanis, foreigners and the President, confirm their apprehensions. However, the Americans have been forwarding their own reservations on our conditional and limited support against terrorism. Hopefully, doubts would end, once our tribal belt and rest of Pakistan becomes as normal as they used to be before Jihads started in Afghanistan, and also in Kashmir valley. Keeping our apprehensions and American reservation apart, American engagement helped us and also harmed us. However, in both the cases, choice was mainly ours. Had we acted wisely, we could have avoided much of the harm, and extracted substantial and sustained benefits also. Though America’s intervention was another reason for early end of British rule and hence for partition of India, our active engagement with the Americans began when in early fifties we needed food. American wheat came, along with the friendship that still continues, in spite of doubts and intermittent divorces. Americans also helped us in securing our lifeline, water, through Indus Basin Treaty. On Kashmir, they stood by us in the UN, but not beyond. Though, some other way out, other than the plebiscite, could be found, had America guided us sincerely. That it did not because corner stone of its policy was to keep our region fragmented by creating a barrier between the USSR and India. Unfortunately we were to act as the said barrier. Since our American friendship was anti-USSR (about China US had soft corner since mid fifties, in spite of its communism), it was our contractual obligation to confront USSR, when asked; but towards India we should have adopted pragmatic approach, as US had done towards China: And that we did not because we had entered into American Bloc, primarily, to win Kashmir through influence and might of the alliance. That is why we were, only, interested in weapons and dollars. We got plenty during Ayub and Zia rule. In return we provided bases, borders, mujahids and their training camps and much more. A part of Ayub era dollars helped swell the wallets of the high officials and the rich, so it amicably served personal purposes. That with the remaining dollars we purchased more weapons, in addition to the ones that came free, served our “wise” India-centric strategy. Meanwhile no one cared about the escalating miseries and the poverty of the people, and rising internal ethnic distrust. Loaded with weapons and confidence of being an ally of America, we fought wars of 1965 and 1971 and lost, and also lost half of the country.Zia needed legitimacy and the dollars, the high officials and the rich needed bigger accounts, the Mullahs needed prosperity and end of pagans, Arabs needed a tribal state or even a tribal region, and the Americans and the westerners needed defeat of the Soviets. A bargain was struck. Jihad against Soviets was launched in Afghanistan. Zia government got 4.35 billion dollars, legitimacy and the fringe benefits, and Zia’s friends and the high officials, and the Mullahs and the others traded arms and drugs freely, within and without. The militants spread militancy during and after the Jihad, the world over. Jihad forced USSR to withdraw, but it did not spare its sponsors either. Pakistani is in trouble, so are Arabs and the westerners. Not to forget the Americans, who got 9/11? Thus military side of our American connection proved fatal internally as well as externally. The economic side did help but not as much as it could have, it was and is entirely due to our rulers. Their financial management was and is not pro-people. Ayub created twenty-two rich families. America did not stop him from creating more through development of society; but he was busy with the war preparation and self-preservation. Zia in contrast created hundreds of rich families, who in turn created Muslim League for him, which is now, mostly, in league with Musharraf. Zia spent dollars and mammoth state loans on his constituencies and cronies---which were Military, Muslim League, Mullahs, militants and the rich---simply to remain in uniform. No one, including the Americans, stopped him from spending on the people and from changing the dress. And they are not stopping General Musharraf either. Musharraf got legitimacy through the Judiciary and the so-called referendum. Dollars again came from America or due to a reason based in America. Whatever General and his managers may say the fact remains that a day before 9/11, the Government of Pakistan owned only 1.5 billion dollars. Most came through buying from open market. Enormous pressure of loans and balance of payment existed, despite rescheduling and low imports. The country was virtually in the grip of increasing economic chaos. Before anarchy could take over, 9/11 came. Courtesy America; today and for the time being we are facing less or no pressure from the lenders; and our foreign currency reserves have increased many fold. Yet, not much is changing for the people, rather magnitude of poverty is more than that of Ayub period, because we are still more interested in the prosperity of constituencies and cronies, and in bombs and missiles, and not in peoples’ uplift.Poverty as in individuals is also a curse for the nations. Factually sovereignty is directly proportional to prosperity; or dependence is a function of poverty. And poverty will only be alleviated through earned dollars, and not through rewards, aids and alms. Begging bowels, ultimately, become black holes---nothing escapes from falling into, be it pride or sovereignty or unity---or even ray of hope. Thus, what is needed is that we should turn down America’s offer of making us a Major Non-NATO Ally; we have enough of weaponry and army, instead we should seek a kind of economic alliance, which America has with Mexico. NAFTA should be taken as relationship reference, and not NATO. That is what political economy of our renewed American connection should mean to us, and that is what Americans must be conveyed; and that is how American sincerity with us, and our ruling elite’s sincerity with the people will be tested
*Courtesy to Paktribune (paktribune.com)